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The discovery of sugarcane smut in one Queensland cane region, in June 
2006, triggered a clear-cut biosecurity response aimed at containment and 
eradication.  Farm financial analyses helped to set the incentives offered to 
canegrowers to gain their cooperation in the eradication effort financed by 
the Queensland and Australian governments. 
Eradication was abandoned when the smut became endemic in November 
2006, and the disease management that took its place was now entirely 
Queensland’s responsibility.  A number of conflicting stakeholder 
objectives had to be reconciled by the Queensland government in 
determining the type and extent of industry assistance.   An independent 
inquiry was called to consider the scientific, production, economic and 
social aspects of the problem.  Economic modelling of farmer decisions, 
farm economics analyses and regional adaptation scenarios were carried 
out.  The results indicated that government largesse would not actually 
contribute to industry’s adjusting to the endemic disease.  Instead, a 
smaller but targeted contribution to plant breeding was offered.  The 
industry cooperated with the process and accepted the outcomes. 
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Introduction 
The objective of this paper is to outline the author’s perceptions of political, policy and 
economic aspects of the biosecurity response to sugarcane smut in Australia in 2006-07.   
The method is essentially descriptive.  The paper follows the timeline of the infestation 
and response, recalls the actions of major stakeholders and reviews the analyses carried 
out by various agencies.  Being a real-life policy problem, a perspective of political 
economy is advantageous for its assessment. 
Since 2005, there has been a national institutional framework for dealing with specific 
introduced pests in Australia.  The protocols are laid out in the Plant Health Australia 
Emergency Plant Pest Response Deed2 (henceforth, Deed).  A key component of the 
Deed is that, once eradication of the pest is decided, ‘owner reimbursement costs’ (ORC) 
are to be paid for all plants or crops destroyed in full compensation for actual- and 
opportunity costs (CIE 2004).  The cost components are outlined in detail and their 
calculation, including updating with current prices, agreed to by all parties.  For farmers, 
this creates certainty and a financial incentive to cooperate with control measures.  For 
governments, it provides a cap on financial commitments and a way to deflect industry 
rent seeking.   
Cane smut was the first response managed under the Deed.  It followed the controversial 
case of the outbreak of citrus canker in the Emerald region of Queensland in 2004.  At 
that time, the Deed was still being negotiated, uncoordinated State rules regulated the 
response, and all major stakeholders were subsequently criticized for their role in the 
canker response (Senate 2006). 
Cane smut is a fungal disease of the sugarcane plant that was first recorded in South 
Africa in 1877.  By 1997, it had spread to all canegrowing regions of the world except 
Australia, Fiji and Papua New Guinea.  It can reduce crop yields by over 50% and make 
ratoon (regrowth) crops unprofitable to maintain.  It is highly infectious, and even 








2 The Deed constitutes an agreement between the Australian and State governments about the response and 
cost sharing if the introduction of a number of prescribed invasive pests and diseases should occur.  
Separate agreements outline further details of the arrangements reflecting unique characteristics of specific 
industries/commodities. Thus, Queensland Canegrowers is a signatory to the agreement on sugarcane.  For  
details see:  
http://www.planthealthaustralia.com.au/our_projects/display_project.asp?category=2&ID=3&page=all 
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developed countries have been unable to stay smut free even with the use of appropriate 
quarantine measures (Croft and Magarey 1997).  
Queensland’s Department of Primary Industries & Fisheries (DPI&F) has responsibilities 
for both the primary-industries sector and for biosecurity issues in the state.  It also 
manages practices in the sugar industry, among others, by prescribing which varieties can 
be planted in individual regions.  As such, DPI&F carried most of the responsibility 
within the Queensland government associated with the smut incursion.. 
 
Background 
The Australian sugar industry 
Figure 1 shows the spatial spread of the Australian sugar industry, around 95% of which 
is located in Queensland, with the rest in northern NSW.  The lone sugar mill in Western 
Australia’s Ord region closed in December 2007. 
 
Source: Queensland Sugar Ltd  
Figure 1 Geographical distribution of the Australian sugar industry 
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The Australian, particularly the Queensland, sugar industry has an institutional legacy 
surprisingly similar to that of the once centrally-planned agricultures of Eastern Europe 
(Antony 2004).  Most important among them for this narrative is the conditioned 
dependence on government assistance when encountering difficulties.  In departure from 
this, the industry has made substantial progress to reform its formal and informal 
institutions over the last decade.  While government assistance to this process can be 
justified, its extent was likely to reinforce old industry reflexes.  Assistance packages 
were announced for the sugar industry in 1998, 2000, 2002 and 2004 – the latest in 
political compensation for sugar’s being excluded from the free-trade agreement with the 
US. 
 
Sugarcane smut in Australia 
Before 1998, 70% of Australia’s sugarcane varieties were susceptible to smut.  Sugarcane 
smut was first identified in the Ord region of Western Australia on 20 July 1998, 
probably carried by wind from Indonesia.  Due to the extent of the infection at the time of 
discovery, eradication was not possible in the Ord, as it would have required the complete 
cessation of canegrowing in the whole region for two years.  Instead, Ord canegrowers 
agreed to manage the disease by ploughing out cane more than 5% infected immediately 
and switching to resistant varieties, a process that was nearly complete in 2001 (Engelke 
et al. 2001).   
However reduced its impact was, smut still survived in the Ord, requiring the 
introduction of quarantine measures to prevent the spread to the eastern canegrowing 
regions.  Smut resistance became an objective of varietal selection in Australia that year 
(Croft and Berding 2005). 
Even though the arrival of smut was considered inevitable, many cultivars used in 
Queensland were still susceptible to the disease.  In 2004, 66% of the eastern-Australian 
sugar crop was from 36 susceptible varieties.  Resistant and intermediate varieties 
numbered five and eight, and supplied 8% and 26% of the crop, respectively (Croft and 
Berding 2005).  Moreover, as the best-yielding new varieties were susceptible, there had 
been a general movement away from resistant varieties in the industry when smut 
appeared on the east coast. 
 
Smut in Queensland 
First appearance 
Cane smut was identified on material from a cane farm in the Isis-Bundaberg region, near 
the Queensland town of Childers, on 10 June 2006.  The control plan previously 
developed by BSES Ltd with the cooperation of Australian Qarantine Inspection Service 
was immediately activated, and the property was immediately placed under quarantine 
under Queensland’s Plant Protection Act.  Movement controls on machinery were 
introduced, along with various compulsory measures aimed at confining the pathogen to   6 
the quarantine area.  The state government committed $15.6 over four years to fight the 
disease. 
By the end of July, over 50 properties were under quarantine, and the cane industry was 
warning of dire consequences: 30% to 100% production losses (CANEGROWERS 
2006a) and a potential impact of up to $200 million on the Queensland economy (ABC 
2006a).   
The provisions of the Deed meant that full cost sharing applied to sugarcane smut, 
including an industry contribution to all costs.  The Australian Government was to pay 
50% of the government contribution with most of the rest falling on Queensland, due to 
the location of the industry.  Although the sugarcane provisions of the Deed had not been 
yet completed, negotiations were speeded up to arrive at an interim but compliant figure.   
 
Analyses to aid policy decisions 
To underpin the decisions, financial analyses were conducted by DPI&F, 
CANEGROWERS and ABARE (on behalf of the Australian Government), to model the 
impact of the disease and the response measures on individual farms and canegrowing 
regions.  The analytical work was done by a working party that included state and 
national agricultural and treasury departments and sugar-industry stakeholders, allowing 
for a flow of information and immediate peer review.  The short timelines required bare-
bones analyses that are just sufficient to answer the policy questions, rather than refined 
and sophisticated studies. 
The initial DPI&F analysis in July aimed at identifying the level of ORC on the basis of a 
three-year eradication campaign derived from detailed farm budgets and technology 
assumptions.   CANEGROWERS (2006b) supported the destruction of infected crops, 
and urged its members to take up the offer, even though “the cost of destroying 
productive cane is significant and the funding will not offset losses which occur as a 
result”.  Notwithstanding political statements, the agreed $2000/ha owner reimbursement 
constituted a level of return to canegrowers that had good incentive value to encourage 
finding and exterminating disease, rather than trying to hide it. 
Other analyses aimed at establishing the extent of potential industry impact.  Both 
CANEGROWERS and ABARE prepared industry models disaggregated to the level of 
five Pest Quarantine Areas (PQAs) that segment the state north to south.  The models 
compared a no-response approach to sugarcane smut to a response scenario that included 
eradication in Isis-Bundaberg and a number of quarantine measures in other areas.  It was 
assumed that replanting with resistant varieties would proceed under both scenarios, but 
the response scenario would allow for faster replacement of all susceptible plants in the 
infected Isis-Bundaberg region.  While even destruction of infected crops in Isis-
Bundaberg would not prevent eventual spread of the smut to the whole industry, it was 
expected to delay it by three-to-four years.  BSES scientists produced the expected values 
for the spread of the disease and its impact on susceptible varieties.  These parametric 
assumptions were subject to extensive debate through the process, and industry 
stakeholders called BSES estimates ‘conservative’.     7 
The CANEGROWERS model calculated the present value of response in each PQA, 
based on the differences of discounted grower incomes under the two scenarios over 20 
years.  All PQAs showed a positive expected value for response. ABARE prepared a 
more detailed model that tested the financial justification of the response option from a 
societal perspective.  They found that a net saving of $119m is expected from the 
response costing some $45m, resulting in a benefit-cost ratio of 1.56:1.   
 
The policy response 
The response measures were thus implemented with the reasonable expectation of a net 
social gain.  Using its legislated powers, DPI&F removed susceptible varieties from the 
list of varieties allowed for planting in Isis-Bundaberg, but not in other regions.  No 
blanket ban was imposed on the growing of ratoon crops from, or harvesting of, 
susceptible varieties in Isis-Bundaberg.  Instead, the total destruction of heavily-infested 
stands was ordered, along with the burnt harvesting of light infestations and increased 
monitoring.  Voluntary destruction of infected cane by farmers was to be compensated.  
Quarantine between and within the PQAs was maintained, and all cane regions stepped 
up the monitoring of their crops. 
 
Endemic stage 
The discovery of smut in a large canegrowing region, Mackay, in early November 2006 
radically changed the situation:  
•  Endemicity of the disease meant that the emergency response was over and the Deed 
ceased to apply.  Queensland was now on its own without binding agreements of help 
from elsewhere, and given its different political colour at the time, the Australian 
government was inclined to see smut as a Queensland problem. 
•  The distance from Childers of over 500 km made it unlikely that the spread resulted 
from a breach of quarantine, and now the whole $1 billion industry was under threat.   
•  Even if scientifically sound and physically possible, financing the replication of 
measures taken in Isis-Bundaberg across the whole industry would have been very 
difficult for the Queensland government.   
•  However, the sugar industry, accustomed to government assistance over much 
smaller calamities, expected substantive help in what clearly was a major crisis. 
Immediately, the Queensland government announced an inquiry into the potential 
economic impact of the disease and the best way to deal with it.  The head of the inquiry, 
an economist with a PhD and a previous state Liberal Party leader, had both professional 
authority and political independence from the major stakeholders and the government.  
With the report due mid-February 2007, the government avoided being pushed into 
making commitments in the heat of the moment.  This action also diminished the political 
fallout from smut’s appearance in the largest cane region, the Herbert River area, in mid-
December.   8 
The inquiry had two major components: on-the-ground industry consultation and a suite 
of economic analyses.  The purpose was to establish the expected extent of economic 
impact, and to identify measures to facilitate economic recovery (Watson 2007).  The 
latter question soon turned into a query of how long the industry was willing to live with 
susceptible cane stands, and whether there were ways/justification for accelerating the 
replacement of susceptible cane with resistant varieties.   
Now for the whole of Queensland, DPI&F had to decide which varieties can be planted, 
ratooned or harvested at all, where, and when?  A total ban on susceptible varieties had 
potentially large opportunity costs.  Northern cane regions had a suite of approved 
resistant varieties yielding as well as susceptible ones.  However, moving south, a yield 
gap opened and progressively widened in favour of the susceptible varieties.  Given that 
smut was spreading progressively, the optimal year of replacement was when the initial 
yield advantage of susceptible varieties was overcome by smut losses.   Still, a general 
rule could not be established, as smut was not uniformly established, and neither were 
growers’ expectations identical regarding further spread, yield differentials and the 
acceptable risk.   
 
Analyses to aid policy decisions 
As in the first stage of smut infestation, a working group was established to guide, carry 
out and critique the analyses.  Membership included industry stakeholders, various 
government departments and an academic economist.  Three studies were carried out to 
aid the inquiry. 
O’Donnell (2007) built a model to calculate monetary payoffs and utility values from 
standing susceptible cane, resistant cane and alternative crops.  Low and high 
probabilities of smut spread were distinguished as separate scenarios.  For a low 
probability, both risk neutral and slightly risk-averse growers should plant susceptible 
cane, while with a high probability, the best payoff would be from alternative crops for 
any type of risk preference.  The significance of this analysis was not fully appreciated by 
the working group, distracted by key parameter values chosen by the author and 
objections to some alternative crops not seen as realistic choices for canegrowers. 
Sing (2007) further developed the sugarcane version of DPI&F’s Farm Economic 
Analysis Tool (FEAT) to calculate the financial implications of smut-related decisions.  
FEAT uses a detailed real-life model of the farming system.  Farm operations on each 
block are followed and enumerated over a number of years.  Gross margins and farm-
level profitability measures are shown and compared with alternatives containing a 
different development of the farming system.  Populated with smut-spread data 
applicable to different cane regions, three or four representative farm models were 
prepared for each region, and presented as part of the local consultation with industry.  
Results confirmed that enforced replanting with resistant varieties can impose large 
opportunity costs on farms not yet affected by smut.  The use of susceptible varieties for 
ratoons was a rational choice in many cases and, given favourable smut exposure, even 
their planting could be profitable in southern regions.  The use of FEAT modelling was 
offered to industry to assist canegrowers in their decision making.   9 
Antony (2007) prepared an industry-wide model of replanting at the level of four major 
canegrowing regions accounting for 66% of Queensland’s cane crop in 2005.  The model 
distinguished and counted areas planted to susceptible and resistant varieties of original 
and new stands between 2003 and 2006.  Their yield advantage caused susceptible 
varieties to gain in all regions in those years.  Between 2007 and 2014, replanting 
simulations were driven by a simple decision rule that favoured (a) susceptible varieties 
for the notional base case of no smut, and (b) resistant ones for the smut-infected actual 
scenario.  A technology constraint prescribed the proportion of area replanted.  With a 
six-year crop cycle (fallow, plant crop and four ratoons), normally one-sixth of the cane 
is replaced every year.  Even if farmers wanted faster variety change, machinery capacity 
limits regionwide replacement to around a quarter of the area.  Region-specific data and 
forecasts on the status, spread and impact of smut on yield and CCS (sugar content) were 
supplied by BSES.  Epidemiological data from Isis-Bundaberg   improved industry 
confidence in the BSES forecasts.  Nevertheless, to account for uncertainty, the smut-
impact scenario was duplicated based on ‘optimistic’ and ‘pessimistic’ forecasts about 
smut severity.  Industry worth of the scenarios was measured as net present values of 
both total sugar income and farm gross margin at the regional level.   
Model runs confirmed that the industry was going to be worse off owing to the smut, but 
revealed that the likely extent of impact would not be as great as some earlier reports 
suggested: Table 1 shows the results of calculations for optimistic and pessimistic 
assumptions about the future severity of smut. 
 
Table 1   Likely financial impact of smut on Queensland sugar regions 
  Sugar value  Farm gross margins 
Region  Optimistic  Pessimistic  Optimistic  Pessimistic 
Herbert  -2%  -5%  -6%  -13% 
Burdekin  -1%  -2%  -3%  -4% 
Mackay, Plane Creek & Proserpine  -8%  -8%  -27%  -29% 
Isis-Bundaberg  -10%  -11%  -29%  -32% 
 
As large as these impacts are in some regions, they fall within the range of external 
influences that the industry regularly experiences: even a 10% drop in the sugar price 
would have a larger effect (Table 2).   
 
Table 2   Comparison of smut and price impacts on the Queensland sugar industry 
  Sugar value  Farm gross margins 
  Base 
case 
Optimistic  Pessimistic  Base 
case 
Optimistic  Pessimistic 
Smut  
annual $m  78  96  47  55 
10% sugar-price drop 
annual $m  152      98     
Both impacts are calculated in the model as the average of 2007 present values over 2007-14, scaled up to 
the whole Queensland industry 
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Thus, smut can be seen as similar in impact to other risks associated with running a sugar 
business.  However, the appearance of the smut had been anticipated since 1998: those 
choosing to plant susceptible varieties were taking a calculated risk. 
The policy option of enforcing a faster rate of replanting was tested by raising the 
replanting proportion from the regular 17% to 25%.  All financial returns in all regions 
were marginally worse under this option, primarily owing to the higher unproductive 
fallow area. 
While northern regions had an adequate set of resistant varieties for most agroclimatic 
niches, the choice was much more limited in the south.  Moreover, there was a physical 
shortage of any resistant planting material for Isis-Bundaberg for the autumn 2007 
plantings.  Hence, the industry requested approval for the limited planting of susceptible 
varieties at that time.  A model run allowing 2000 ha susceptible plantings indicated 
positive financial results under optimistic smut severity, and a small potential negative 
outcome should the pessimistic forecast eventuate.  While small but positive on the 
balance of probabilities for 2007, the outcome of a similar small planting of susceptibles 
was unequivocally negative from 2008. 
 
The policy response 
The findings of the Watson inquiry were accepted by both the Queensland government 
and industry stakeholders.  It was agreed that there is no advantage to forcing a faster 
replacement of susceptible stands than the regular crop cycle.  Neither is there a useful 
way of improving the industry’s smut response in the short run, even with large sums of 
money.  Instead, the government could best help by resourcing the accelerated release of 
new resistant varieties by BSES.   
 
Conclusions 
The initial outbreak of sugarcane smut, the first test of the new national institutional 
framework for managing biosecurity incursions provided positive proof for the concept 
and the implementation.  The predetermined protocols gave clear guidance and they were 
followed.  The affected industry was fully engaged in the process, helped in developing 
the response and accepted the decisions. Analysis proved that reasonable expectation of 
net social returns justified the chosen response to the initial infestation.   
The situation was much more difficult when the smut appeared in further cane regions.  
There were no protocols to follow, Queensland faced a potentially catastrophic situation 
on its own, and old industry attitudes created expectations of substantial financial 
assistance from the government.  Skill in the political reaction of government created the 
time needed for the quick but adequate analysis of options.  The policy decision took full 
account of the analytical results.  It became clear that even generous financial assistance 
by the government could not improve short-term industry adjustment to the endemic 
disease.  Instead, targeted use of funds for improving longer-term adjustment was 
decided.  Again, the involvement of industry stakeholders in the process helped the 
acceptance of the decision.   11 
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